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NATIONAL INCOME INSURANCE: SOME IMPLICATIONS
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY*
John B. Williamson
Boston College
Several co-workers and I have recently completed an
evaluation of sixty-three anti-poverty programs and proposals
(Williamson, et. al., 1973, 1974). This paper briefly describes
the study and some of our findings by way of introduction to the
presentation and defense of a national income insurance proposal,
This proposal is a synthesis of three highly rated anti-poverty
strategies. It would within a few years have a substantial impact
on the extent of the economic inequality in the United States.
The 1960's was an era of experimentation. A wide range of
anti-poverty strategies were proposed and many were tried. Of
those since discontinued many were clearly ineffective, but
others would, no doubt, have proven effective had they been
expanded and continued over a longer period of time. This
research is an effort to systematically examine what we have
learned from the experiments of the 1960's in the hope that this
experience will be taken in consideration in the formulation of
future anti-poverty policy.
Many of the strategies we consider have been the subject
of previous evaluations, some have been the subject of numerous
such evaluations. But previous studies have often considered
only one program and rarely consider more than a few. The
contribution of our study is in its breadth.
The strategies we consider can be grouped into six
general anti-poverty approaches: (1) income-in-kind, (2) income,
(3) manpower, (4) education, (5) economic development, and (6)
organization. The economic development approach includes
strategies which would create jobs for the poor in response to
local or national economic expansion. The organization approach
includes those strategies which encourage the poor to act
together and in cooperation with others so as to increase their
political influence.
* I am grateful to Ralph Segalman for a number of valuable
suggestions on an earlier draft of his paper. The article is
based in part on a forthcoming book, Strategies Against Poverty
in America (Williamson, et. al., 1974).
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Our analysis has three objectives: (1) to evaluate the
major anti-poverty strategies within each of the six preceding
general approaches; (2) to compare strategies within each of
these six approaches; and (3) to compare strategies across these
six general approaches. For each of these objectives we make
extensive use of a set of twenty-six dimensions (evaluative
criteria). For example, we consider such dimensions as proportion
of the poor who benefit, impact on the distribution of income,
and extent to which recipients are stigmatized. A subset of
eighteen of these dimensions are used to compute an overall rating
for each strategy. For this purpose eight dimensions are excluded
so as to reduce redundancy and to eliminate dimensions which
cannot be used in an unambiguous way to argue for or against a
specific strategy. For a description of the strategies evaluated,
the twenty-six dimensions used in the evaluation, and a more
detailed discussion of our methodology see Williamson, et.al.
(1974: 110-114, 190-200, 213-218; 1973: 409-444, 881-889).
Of the sixty-three strategies considered, the guaranteed
income proposal of the National Welfare Rights Organization receives
the highest overall rating. The NWRO has modified its proposal
several times over the years. The version we consider includes
a guaranteed minimum income of $6,500 per year for a family of
four and would have cost approximately $52 billion in 1969. The
tax rate on all other sources of income would be 67 percent until
the breakeven point (the point at which the tax paid on all other
sources of income equals the guaranteed income due) of $9,750
was reached.
The government as employer of last resort proposal is also
highly rated. This proposal calls for efforts to find job
placements in the private sector, but in addition guarantees
a job to those who are unable to obtain employment. Of the
existing federal programs considered, social security receives
the highest rating. This program transfers more money to those
who are poor or who would otherwise be poor than does any other
income maintenance program (Green, 1967:20).
The NWRO guaranteed income proposal is one of several
negative income tax proposals we consider. The negative income
tax proposals are consistently rated higher than AFDC. The
proposal we now turn to consider is referred to as national
income insurance. It represents an effort to combine the strengths
of social security, the negative income tax, and the guaranteed
job into one integrated program which would be both politically
feasible and effective in reducing the extent of poverty.
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NATIONAL INCOME INSURANCE
In recent years a variety of guaranteed income proposals
have been made. There is little consensus as to the generic
categories for the classification of these proposals, but the
terms "negative income tax" (Friedman, 1962: Green, 1967; Lampman,
1970) and "credit income tax" (Rolph, 1967; Rainwater, 1973;
Gans, 1973, Shostak, et al., 1973) are the most commonly used
today. The basic distinction between the two is that the credit
income tax calls for a reform of the entire income tax structure
whereas other negative income tax proposals do not call for any
changes in the tax structure above the breakeven point.
The income (or anti-poverty) insurance approach (Etzioni,
1969, 1970; Jencks, et al., 1972: 228-229) can be classified
as a form of negative income tax. The approach differs from
other negative income tax proposals in that there is some link
with employment such as being financed all or in part by a payroll
tax or basing benefits on past earnings. In this sense the
approach can be compared with existing social insurance programs
such as social security, unemployment insurance, and workmen's
compensation.
The national income insurance plan presented here is so
named because it would provide social insurance benefits whenever
family (or individual) income fell below a specified level.
Initially the program would provide a guaranteed income equal to
25 percent of the median family income adjusted for family size in
the same way the Social Security Administration's poverty index
is adjusted. All other income would be taxed at a rate of 50
percent until the breakeven point was reached. Above the breakeven
point the current tax schedule would be used. Assuming that such
a program was introduced in 1975 and the median income was
$12,000 for a family of four, the guaranteed minimum income would
be $3,000 and the breakeven point would be $6,000. Those with
other sources of income of less than $6,000 would receive a net
payment; many with incomes just above $6,000 would pay less tax
than under the current tax system.
There would be no employment requirement for those unable
to work due to family responsibilities, poor health, or age; but
other recipients would be required to obtain employment in the
private sector, to accept one of the guaranteed jobs that would
be created by the government, or to participate in some form of
alternative service (e.g. job training, adult education, VISTA,
something similar to the old WPA's writers' project, etc.).
The program would originally add less than $10 billion to
the federal budget. Half of this would be raised by a payroll
tax similar to that presently used to finance the social security
program. The rest would be financed out of general federal
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.revenues. A similar procedure has been proposed to finance
Kennedy's national health insurance plan.
Central to the national income insurance plan is the provision
for increasing the magnitude of the guaranteed minimum income. The
level would be uniformly incremented from the original 25 percent
to 50 percent of the median income ten years after the introduction
of the program.1 The cost would increase to approximately $80
billion per year.
In the discussion that follows we consider a number of arguments
that can be made in support of the national income insurance plan.
Many of these arguments are equally applicable to other similar
negative income tax and credit income tax proposals. The discussion
is in this sense a review of the strengths of the guaranteed income
approach to income maintenance. There are also a number of arguments
that can be made against the national income insurance plan; they
will be presented and evaluated in a subsequent paper (Williamson,
1975).
The national income insurance plan would be universalistic;
that is, it would provide benefits to all poor persons. At present
all anti-poverty and welfare programs in the United States are
categorical; they provide benefits to certain categories of the
poor while excluding others. One justification offered for this
approach is that it encourages tailoring programs to the specific
needs of various categories of the poor. This would in itself
be a desirable characteristic, but when put into practice the
approach serves to exclude certain categories of the poor. The
major rational for breaking with the categorical approach is that
efforts to restrict benefits to those who are clearly deserving
inevitably lead to the exclusion of many who under careful scrutiny
also turn out to be deserving. An obvious case in point is the
exclusion of children living in families headed by able-bodied
males. In contrast a universalistic program such as the national
income insurance plan would assure that at least some benefits
reach all of the poor.
The plan would eventually provide sufficient economic security
to encourage long term efforts to become self-sufficient. When
first introduced the program would not provide sufficient economic
security to encourage such efforts. But as the level of the
guaranteed minimum income increased, long range efforts would become
increasingly common. When a family has to worry about where the
money is going to come from for next week's groceries, little
attention can be given to such luxuries as obtaining more education
or training for a higher skilled job; but an assured steady income
would in many cases free the family of such immediate economic
worries. The potential gain to the rest of society is particularly
clear with respect to those families which are presently in a
dependent status and include one or more able-bodied workers.
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Many workers remain in economically depressed areas with little
demand for their labor due to fear of the economic insecurity involved
in moving to an unknown region of the country in search of employment.
A guaranteed income would provide at least some of these workers with
the security they would need to seriously consider moving to another
region in the hope of finding more suitable employment opportunities.
Critics of the national income insurance plan (and of guaranteed
income plans more generally) would argue that the economic security
provided is more likely to discourage efforts to remain self-
sufficient than it is to encourage efforts to become self-sufficient.
There is some evidence that those in the middle class tend to under-
estimate the work orientation of the poor (Goodwin, 1972a, 1972b).
There is also evidence from the New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative in-
come tax experiment which suggests that a guaranteed income of up
to the current poverty line would have relatively little impact on
labor force participation, particularly among males (Rees, 1974).
But the evidence is not conclusive and in the absence of conclusive
evidence, personal ideology becomes an important determinant of beliefs
about the likely impact of a guaranteed income on labor force par-
ticipation and work effort.
The plan would lead to a gradual improvement in working conditions
and higher wages in many industries. It would free many of the poor
of their present dependence on the low-wage labor market. To continue
to attract workers, employers would have to increase wages and improve
working conditions. This would lead to an increase in the cost of
many of the services presently supplied by the low-wage labor market.
It would also lead to the collapse of those industries which are
dependent on the present pool of low-wage labor for their existence.
Many of those leaving jobs in the low-wage labor market would be
shifting to one of the government guaranteed jobs. Those who view
virtually any kind of employment in the private sector as preferable
to the creation of massive government supported employment programs
will obviously look upon this shift in employment patterns unfavorably.
The plan would provide a focus around which the poor and near-poor
could organize nationally. One objective around which the poor could
organize would be efforts to get the level of guaranteed minimum in-
come increased. This would be particularly crucial if an automatic
mechanism for incrementation were not included in the original program.
But even if the procedure suggested were included, the guaranteed
minimum income would remain at 50 percent of the median income after
that level had been reached. At that point the poor and near-poor
could push for still further increase in the level of the guaranteed
minimum income. The precedent of the preceding increments could be
used to argue for still further increments. The poor could also push
for a reduction in the 50 percent marginal tax rate on income below
the breakeven point. The eventual goal could be to transform the
curvilinear schedule of marginal tax rates into a progressive schedule
starting at say 20 percent and increasing.
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Such a plan would lead to a more equitable distribution of income
in the United States. The low initial level of the guaranteed minimum
income would have relatively little impact; but if appropriate mechanisms
for incrementing the guaranteed minimum income were included, the
eventual impact on the distribution of income would be substantial.
A more equitable distribution of income would be valued by many for
its impact on the distribution of scarce goods, services, opportunities,
political influence, and the like. Some argue that a more equitable
distribution would also contribute to reducing the extent of various
forms of social pathology presently associated with poverty (Gans,
1973: 20-22).
The national income insurance plan would reduce the extent of
both the absolute and the relative deprivation of the poor. However,
even with improvement in the relative economic position of the poor,
the psychological feeling of deprivation may remain high. Improvements
in objective conditions do not necessarily lead to reduced feelings
of deprivation because expectations can and often do increase at a
more rapid pace than these improvements.
A more equitable distribution of income would clearly benefit
those at the lower end of the income distribution. There would also
be some benefits to those at the upper end. For example, spending
presently associated with various poverty related social problems
could be reduced. But it is unlikely that such savings would be
considered worth the added tax burden to those in the upper income
brackets. As much as the social reformer wants to argue that re-
distribution of income is in everyone's best interest, most of those
who would as a result carry a heavier tax burden are not going to
view redistribution in these terms. Since those with high incomes
have a disproportionate amount of political influence, any efforts
to markedly change the income distribution are going to face stiff
opposition.
Two important questions remain to be considered. (1) Is it
likely that a national income insurance plan or some other such
negative income tax plan will be introduced as a federal program at
any time in the near future? (2) If such a program is introduced,
will it be just another liberal reform or will it lead to funda-
mental changes in the social structure and dominant value orientation
of our society?
The negative income tax was originally proposed by Milton
Friedman, one of the foremost conservative economists in the country.
The approach was subsequently backed by the Nixon administration in
the form of the FAP proposal. The major reason that the approach
appeals to conservatives is that it would be considerably more
efficient than the complex maze of programs for the poor that exists
today. Many take the view that such a program could replace not
only existing federal and state welfare programs, but in addition
a number of others in such areas as housing, education, and manpower.
In short, the approach is viewed as a way to cut welfare spending.
The approach has also received support from liberals; Senator
McGovern (1972) called for a form of the credit income tax in his
bid for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972.2 To
liberals the approach is viewed as less stigmatizing, more efficient,
and more equitable than the present welfare system. It is viewed
as a way to deliver more in the way of welfare benefit per dollar
of federal welfare spending. Liberals are less likely to view the
approach as a replacement for other social welfare programs and
generally do not argue that the approach can or should be used to
reduce the overall extent of social welfare spending.
The present welfare system is under attack from all sides.
There is general agreement that the existing structure is not
adequate for dealing with today's welfare needs. The negative in-
come tax and the credit income tax are the only alternatives that
have been seriously suggested as replacements for the existing wel-
fare system. As we have seen there are strong arguments for these
alternatives, from both liberal and conservative perspectives. In
view of these considerations, it is not unreasonable to argue that
it is only a matter of time before a negative income tax or credit
income tax of some sort is introduced. Nixon's FAP proposal was
rejected by the Senate, but it did pass the more conservative House
by an almost two-to-one vote.
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We now turn to the second question. If such a program is intro-
duced, will it lead to fundamental changes in the social structure
and dominant value orientation? Once a national income insurance
plan or some other such guaranteed income plan is introduced, a
situation will exist in which national mass political organization of
the poor will be feasible on a scale never before possible. There
have been several national organizations of blacks and there has been
a national organization of welfare recipients, but there has never
been a national organization of all the poor.
The existing maze of separate social welfare programs has made
it all but impossible for the various segments of the poor to unify.
But the introduction of a negative income tax would provide a clear
source of common economic interest for all segments of the poor, in-
cluding poor whites, poor blacks, the aged, the working poor, female
headed families, the disabled, and other presently desperate segments
of the poor.
Any such program will include as one component a guaranteed mini-
mum income. It will be in the interest of all categories of the poor
to push for increases in the guaranteed minimum income. Any such
program will also include a relatively high marginal tax rate on
earned income and many of the poor can be expected to support efforts
to get this rate reduced. These two objectives will provide a focus
for efforts to organize the poor. The goals will be clear and the
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potential benefits obvious; there will be no need to appeal to distant
and abstract ideological objectives.
For any politically feasible negative income tax plan the
initial guaranteed minimum income will be low and the marginal tax
rate on earned income will be high. In view of this, it is likely
that there will be considerable support in the general population
for a gradual increase in the size of the guaranteed minimum income
and a gradual decrease in the marginal tax rate. Legislators will
undoubtedly use such benefits to seek votes in much the same way
they presently use increments in social security benefits.
However, such concessions no matter how small will increase
the number of people below the breakeven point. This will increase
the number with an objective economic interest in supporting the
program. These concessions will reward the efforts of those working
to organize the poor and encourage further organizational efforts.
Since increments in the guaranteed minimum income can come in a wide
assortment of sizes, it will be difficult to resist at least modest
increases.
As the years pass and the level of the guaranteed minimum income
increases, more and more of those at the lower end of the income
distribution will become recipients, and what is equally important
they will become politically united. First the poor will be united
with the near poor and subsequently many of those presently in the
working and lower middle classes will be united with them. The
recipient population may eventually constitute a voting majority.
Even before this point is reached, the recipients will become a
major voting block. They can be expected to back reform legislation
designed to undercut the control the rich and corporate interests
have over government decision making. One form this may take would
be restrictions on the size and source of campaign contributions.
This segment of the population can also be expected to back legis-
lation designed to reform the tax structure. Among such reforms might
well be higher inheritance taxes and the elimination of various
inheritance tax loopholes. These and other such measures will un-
doubtedly have a marked impact on the distribution of wealth and
political power.
Suppose a negative income tax is introduced and it starts to
have some of the effects outlined above, wouldn't the rich be quick
to note the threat to their power and to take the necessary steps to
emasculate the program if not to eliminate it all together? There
is a good chance they would. But there is also a possibility that
such efforts would fail. Once the program was introduced it would
begin to gain momentum. The larger the recipient population became
the stronger the resistance would be to efforts to cut it back.
The rich might have to settle for short term efforts to stem the
expansion of the program, and the forces contributing to expansion
might well prove too strong to be permanently halted. Were the
program financed all or in part through a payroll tax in the way
social security is presently financed, the benefits would be viewed
as having been earned. This would considerably increase the
permanence and legitimacy of the program. It would make it a
program with potential benefits to a wide range of the income dis-
tribution, not just to those receiving benefits at any one time.
How about the middle income segment of the population, those
who would not receive benefits from the program, but who would be
paying higher taxes to finance it? Again this segment of the
population, which at the outset would constitute a clear majority,
might decide to push for elimination of the program and could
succeed in this effort. However, it is possible that this would not
occur.
When the program was first introduced, the cost would be low
and the majority of those in the middle income range might well
support it. But as the level of the guaranteed income increased, so
would the cost. This would undoubtedly reduce the extent of support
among nonrecipients. But this does not mean that opposition among
nonrecipients would be universal. Many in the middle and upper in-
come ranges are willing to support social welfare efforts which do
not have any direct economic benefit to themselves. There is
considerable variation in ideological orientation among those in
this segment of the population and at least a substantial minority
could be expected to support even a rather generous guaranteed
minimum income level. The program would be safe as long as the
number of recipients together with the minority of nonrecipients who
support it remained a clear voting majority. Eventually the program
would provide direct benefits to more than half of the voting population
and would be freed of dependence on support from nonrecipients.
When this point was reached the program would be quite secure.
A national income insurance plan would eventually have a major
impact on norms and values. In particular the work ethic and related
aspects of the individualistic value orientation which so pervades
our society today would be undercut. The key to this impact would
be the objective situation of substantially increased economic
security for those with low incomes. Those who were willing to live
at an unusually low standard of living could do so with very little
work effort. While there would be an employment requirement, it is
likely that many participants would do little more than put in their
time. Also those who chose to drop out of the regular labor market
would always know that there would be a job providing a living wage
available should economic need force them to return to work.
This would lead to many other changes Many workers would leave
the most unattractive jobs. Some of these jobs would disappear alto-
gether; others would be automated or come to pay considerably higher
wages. Employers would be forced to pay much more attention to
working conditions, the structure of work, and employee morale.,
It is impossible to fully anticipate the forces that would be
set in motion by the introduction of a national-income insurance
plan or other such negative income tax program. But it is clear
that such a program would eventually lead to major shifts in the
distribution of income, wealth, and political power.
4 These changes
would undoubtedly have a major impact on the dominant value
orientation as well as on the social and economic structnge of
American society.
FOOTNOTES
1. More ambitious goals have been suggested. For example, Rainwater
(1969) has proposed that the goal be to bring the lowest income
category (guaranteed minimum income) up to within $1000 of the
median income.
2. Moynihan (1973:61-62) points out that in the 1968 Democratic
Presidential Primaries, Eugene McCarthy spoke out in favor of
a guaranteed minimum income; Robert Kennedy spoke out in opposition
to the idea.
3. The FAP bill was defeated in the Senate Finance Committee by
liberal votes. Many of those who most strongly opposed the FAP
bill were in favor of greater benefits (Moynihan, 1973:15).
Most of the liberal criticism centered on the work provision
and the level of the guaranteed minimum income. I feel that a
much more serious limitation was that it was to be restricted to
families with dependent children; this provision would have
considerably reduced its impact on the political unification of
those at the lower end of the income distribution.
4. The result would be radical reform or in the words of Andre Gorz
(1967) a non-reformist reform. For a discussion of the distinction
between reformist and non-reformist reforms, see Gorz.
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